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THE PROBATE DEFINITION OF FAMILY: A PROPOSAL FOR
GUIDED DISCRETION IN INTESTACY
Susan N. Gary*
Intestacy statutes may not match the wishes of many people who die intestate.
Changes to the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) include or exclude potential takers,
as the drafters attempt to bring the UPC provisions closer to the intent of more in-
testate decedents. As the UPC tries to fine-tune the intestacy statutes, however,
family circumstances continue to get more and more complicated. Families headed
by unmarried couples, blended families with children from multiple marriages,
and families in which adults raise children who are not legally theirs, have become
commonplace. For some decedents, non-family friends and caregivers may be more
important than legal relatives. Given the diversity of decedents'family structures
and wishes with respect to their property, constructing an intestacy statute based
on fixed rules has become ever more problematic.
This Article examines the UPC's treatment of the family in the intestacy rules and
looks at provisions from other state intestacy statutes. The Article analyzes the defini-
tions of "spouse" and "child" and identifies problems created by the current
definitions. The Article reviews some of the many proposals for intestacy reform, espe-
cially those that advocate a degree of judicial discretion. After discussing provisions
in the UPC and a few state statutes that already permit judicial discretion, the Arti-
cle proposes an intestacy statute that provides a relatively simple default rule for
inheritance and permits judicial discretion, exercised within a framework of statutory
guidance, to determine the proper distribution of an intestate's property.
INTRODUCTION
The UPC and statutes in all states provide default rules that di-
rect the distribution of property when a person dies with probate
property and without a will. The default rules-intestacy statutes-
give the decedent's property to members of the decedent's family,
following rigid relationship rules based on legal status.' For the
most part, functional relationships do not affect inheritance,
OrlandoJ. and Marian H. Hollis Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of
Law. The author would like to thank Professor Adam Hirsch for helpful suggestions on a
draft of this Article and Zachary Harris and Megan Salsbury-Thayer for valuable research
assistance.
1. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-102 to -103 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 36-37
(1998).
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although a potential heir who murders or abuses the decedent may
lose her inheritance.
Although intestacy statutes are only default rules, avoided rela-
tively easily by executing a will or transferring property through
various nonprobate means, the intestacy rules will control the dis-
tribution of property at death for a significant number of people.
People procrastinate when it comes to executing their wills,4 and a
person may assume that the law will give it to her family.' A person
may not want to incur the cost of having a will prepared, and may
dislike the idea of going to a lawyer.6 Complicated family dynamics
may make family members reluctant to discuss estate planning.!
Whatever the reasons, substantial numbers of decedents will have
property distributed pursuant to intestacy statutes.
Intestacy statutes are important not only because they provide
rules for the transfer of property when someone dies without a will,
but also because they provide the definitions for terms used in wills
and trusts. The term "heirs" will be understood based on intestacy
2. See, e.g., § 2-803, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 172-74 (Supp. 2011) (denying a person who kills
the decedent the right to inherit); § 2-114(c), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 91-92 (1998) (denying a
parent who abandons a child the right to inherit); infta text accompanying notes
131-134 (discussing slayer statutes); infra text accompanying notes 135-139 (discussing
parental abandonment of child).
3. In a March 2011 study conducted by Harris Interactive, 57 percent of the 1,000
people surveyed did not have a will. The percentage was greatest for younger people, but 22
percent of those above age sixty-five did not have a will. Jenny Greenhough, 57% of Adults
Don't Have a Will, ROCKET LAWYER INSIDER (Mar. 31, 2011), http://insider.rocketlawyer.com
/201 1-wills-estate-planning-survey-9524. For a list of surveys examining testacy, see Christy G.
Lomenzo, Note, A Goal-Based Approach to Drafting Intestacy Provisions for Heirs Other Than Sur-
viving Spouses, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 941, 945 (1995). Surveys from the 1960s and 1970s found,
unsurprisingly, that intestacy was higher among younger, less educated, and less affluent
respondents. See Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ.
1, 13-14 (2000).
4. See Greenhough, supra note 3 ("[32] percent of Americans would rather do their
taxes, get a root canal, or give up sex for a month than create or update their Will [sic].");
see also Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intes-
tate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 319, 339.
5. See Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REv. 199,
263-64 & n.319 (2001) (citing Monica K Johnson & Jennifer K Robbennolt, Using Social
Science to Inform the Law of Intestacy: The Case of Unmarried Committed Partners, 22 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 479, 489 (1998) for a study that reported that "many [respondents] mistakenly as-
sumed that their nonmarital partners would inherit as intestate heirs (33.3% of respondents
with opposite-sex partners; 46.8% of female respondents with same-sex partners; 43.2% of
male respondents with same-sex partners)").
6. See Foster, supra note 5, at 263.
7. See Marjorie Engel, Pockets of Poverty: The Second Wives Club--Examining the Financial
(In)security of Women in Remarriages, 5 'A. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 309, 343-44 (1999)
(describing the failure to plan in stepfamilies).
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statutes and terms like "descendant" and "issue" will usually be giv-
en the meaning provided by the intestacy statutes."
In addition, intestacy statutes have an expressive function.' Intes-
tacy statutes serve as a statement of what society considers family to
be, because they define who counts as a family member.'o This ex-
pressive function is important in validating family members'
relationships. As Mary Louise Fellows has written, "At the same
time that heirship statutes reflect social norms and values, they also
shape the norms and values by recognizing and legitimating rela-
tionships.""
The primary goal of intestacy statutes, as stated by the drafters of
the UPC and by scholars, is to transfer property according to the
probable intent of a decedent who dies without a will. 2 The stat-
utes try to reach the result that most intestate decedents likely
would want, with an understanding that anyone can execute a will
and avoid the application of the statutes. Recent revisions to the
UPC represent attempts to make the intestacy statute more likely
to reflect the decedent's intent. '
8. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 141-42 (Supp. 2011); § 2-
708, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 203 (1998). A court can interpret one of these terms differently if the
decedent intended a different meaning.
9. See E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-
Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIz. L. REv. 1063, 1063-76 (1999); cf. Adam Hirsch, Default Rules in
Inheritance Laws: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1031, 1053-58 (2004);
Carla Spivack, Let's Get Serious: Spousal Abuse Should Bar Inheritance, 90 OR. L. REv. 247, 259-
61 (2011).
10. See T.P. Gallanis, Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, and the Movement for Same-Sex Equali-
ty, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1513, 1514-16, 1529 (1999) (noting that the expressive nature of legal
default rules might cause social conservatives to urge that laws not be changed to include
same-sex couples); Gary, supra note 3, at 12-13.
11. Mary Louise Fellows, Pride and Preudice: A Study of Connections, 7 VA.J. Soc. POLY &
L. 455, 467 (2000).
12. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. I, general cmt. (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 34 (Sipp.
2011) ("The pre-1990 Code's basic pattern of intestate succession, contained in Part 1, was
designed to provide suitable rules for the person of modest means who relies on the estate
plan provided by law. The 1990 and 2008 revisions were intended to further that purpose, by
fine tuning the various sections and bringing them into line with developing public policy
and family relationships."); Lawrence H. Averill,Jr., An Eclectic History and Analysis of the 1990
Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REv. 891, 913 (1992) ("The legislature substitutes its own
perception of the desires and expectations of the average person for the unexpressed sub-
jective intent of the decedent."); Fellows, supra note 4; Gary, supra note 3 at 7-8; see also
Lomenzo, supra note 3, at 947 (describing the ways in which intestacy distribution serves
society's interests), Spitko, supra note 9, at 1066 (listing seven values that are "central" to the
UPC intestacy provisions).
13. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. I, general cmt. (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 34 (Supp.
2011).
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Another goal for intestacy statutes may be to provide support for
the decedent's dependents." Some commentators have proposed
addressing dependency directly in intestacy statutes rather than
providing for dependents' needs only when the dependents re-
ceive intestate shares as the relatives closest to the decedent. In
addition, the statutes should be perceived to be fair, particularly in
the view of those who survive the decedent." By tying intestacy
statutes to "family," the drafters of these statutes hope they will car-
ry out the intent of many decedents, while providing financial
support to family members. The statutes also support the family
psychologically through the recognition they provide.'6 Unfortu-
nately, for some families the statutes' definitions of family do not
match the decedents' definitions.
Intestacy statutes may also have a public policy role in denying
inheritance to an heir that has engaged in specified bad behavior.
Murdering the decedent will result in the loss of inheritance for
most heirs, and states have begun to deny inheritance to heirs who
have abused or abandoned children, spouses, and elders." The
goal of these provisions may be, in part, to conform to the intent of
the decedent who was murdered or abused, while carrying out so-
ciety's disapprobation of such behavior."
The comments to the UPC note that intestacy statutes should
meet these goals within a probate system that prizes "ease of ad-
ministration and predictability of results."" Increasingly it seems
14. SeeJohn T. Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 497,
501 (1977) (noting that Professor R. Ely had identified the four goals of intestacy statutes as
"(1) continuation of the regime of private property as dominant in the social order; (2)
effectuation of the wishes of the individual; (3) provision for the well-being of the family;
and (4) provision for the well-being of society").
15. See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study,
16 LAW & INEQ. 1, 12 (1998) ("The question of fairness goes beyond issues of equality. Fair-
ness also includes equity considerations of financial dependence, reliance, unjust
enrichment and trust.").
16. SeeJennifer Seidman, Functional Families and Dysfunctional Laws: Committed Partners
and Intestate Succession, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 211, 225 (2004) (noting that emotional com-
mitment and financial interdependence are values intestacy law seeks to protect and
reward); see alsoJennifer R. Boone Hargis, Note, Solving Injustice in Inheritance Laws Through
judicial Discretion: Common Sense Solutions from Common Law Tradition, 2 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD.
L. REV. 447, 451-52 (2003) (describing various goals of intestacy statutes).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 131-50.
18. See, e.g., Paula A. Monopoli, "Deadbeat Dads": Should Support and Inheritance Be
Linked?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 257, 277-78 (1994) (suggesting that blocking inheritance for
abandonment of a child may not reflect the child's intent, because children may want to
maintain a relationship with a father who abandoned them).
19. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. II, general cmt. (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 69 (Supp.
2011) (explaining the decision to use a mechanically determined elective share, rather than
an elective share that would require judicial discretion in determining whether property
held by the spouses was marital property or separate property). When a surviving domestic
790 [VOL. 45:4
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that ease of administration and predictability supersede intent and
need as goals of intestacy statutes. Although ease of administration
is achieved, intestacy statutes likely do not give effect to the intent
of decedents in many cases, may serve to provide intestate shares to
relatives who do not "deserve" or do not need the inheritance, and
may deny shares to persons who were dependent on the decedent
or who were close and helpful to the decedent. Despite many arti-
cles advocating better alignment between intestacy statutes and the
likely wishes of property owners or the needs of surviving family
members,o the existing body of statutes has become increasingly
"antiquated"" and more "like a museum."
Part I of this Article examines the development of U.S. intestacy
law and reviews the current state of the UPC and intestacy statutes
around the country. Part I analyzes the definitions of "spouse" and
"child," looking at the UPC definitions and state statutes. Part I
also considers statutory limits on inheritance based on behavior.
Part 1I then identifies problems created by the current statutes and
argues that guided discretion might provide several advantages
over current law. This part explains that some intestacy statutes al-
ready use a limited degree of judicial discretion and explains the
application of family maintenance, a form of judicial review used
in Commonwealth countries. This part reviews scholarly proposals
that have advocated the use of discretion in specific aspects of in-
testacy statutes. Part III presents a proposal for guided discretion,
explaining the structure of the statute and the guidance the statute
would provide. This part addresses potential criticisms of the pro-
posal and concludes that guided judicial discretion in intestacy
partner challenged the constitutionality of the New York intestacy statute because it denied
him a share of his partner's estate, the court upheld the statute and said:
The state has a substantial, if not overwhelming, interest in having its descent and dis-
tribution scheme clear, simple, predictable and capable of determining heirs at the
moment of death. Determination of distributees must be accomplished with a mini-
mum of hearings, investigations and collateral litigation. This can only be
accomplished by the establishment of a licensing procedure for the creation of the
marital relationship.
In re Petri, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at 29 (N.Y Cnty. Surr. Ct. Apr. 3, 1994).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 184-211.
21. Peter J. Harrington, Untying the Knot: Extending Intestacy Benefits to Non-Traditional
Families by Severing the Link to Maniage, 25 ST. JOHN'S J. C.R. & ECON. DEv. 323, 323 (2011)
(" [N] umerous changes to the traditional family structure have left the UPC intestacy system
antiquated. As a result, the inheritance rights of non-traditional families are vulnerable.").
22. Seidman, supra note 16, at 211 (quoting MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF FAMILY LAw: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN
EUROPE, 289-90 (1989)).
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may provide better results for more families than the current
statutes.
I. CURRENT U.S. INTESTACY LAW
A. Early Development
Over the years, American intestacy statutes have responded to
changes in dispositive preferences. Most American jurisdictions
adopted something similar to the Statute of Distribution of 1670,
which in England applied to personal property.24 The British cus-
tom of primogeniture never took hold in the United States, so U.S.
statutes applied the same rules to real as well as personal property. 5
These statutes provided a one-third share for the surviving spouse
if the decedent left descendants, and a one-half share if the dece-
dent left no descendants. The part of the estate not distributed to
the spouse went to the descendants, or, if there were none, to col-
lateral relatives. Descendants and collateral relatives were those
related by blood, not adoption. States began to adopt formal rules
on adoption in the mid-nineteenth century, and by the twentieth
century, adoption created a parent-child relationship that was
treated as a legal relationship for intestacy as well as other purpos-
es." Thus, by the end of the twentieth century, intestacy's
definition of "family" was primarily based on legal status: blood,
marriage, or adoption.o
23. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 17-36 (1981)
(discussing the effects of changes in marriage and family on intestacy statutes); MARY ANN
GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED
STATES AND 'ESTERN EUROPE 238-40 (1989) (describing the development of the law of
inheritance); MARVIN B. SUSSMAN ET AL., THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 16-23 (1970).
24. See Martin L. Fried, The Uniform Probate Code: Intestate Succession and Related Matters,
55 ALB. L. REV. 927, 936-39 (1992) (discussing Statute of Distribution, 1670, 22 & 23 Car. 2,
c. 10 (Eng.)).
25. See id. at n.2.
26. See id. at 927.
27. See id.
28. SeeJan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What
and Why, 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 714-15 (1984).
29. See id. at 716-17.
30. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-102, -103, -114 (1990) (amended 2008). By the end
of the century, a new status category for domestic partners was being developed. Hawaii
adopted its reciprocal beneficiary statute in 1997, creating intestacy rights for someone reg-
istered as a reciprocal beneficiary. See HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-1 (LexisNexis 2010). A
number of other states now have registration statutes for domestic partners. See infra text
accompanying notes 74-83. All of the registration statutes create a legal status based on
registration. Id.
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The Uniform Law Commission (ULC)" promulgated the first
Uniform Probate Code in 1969. The ULC revised the UPC in sub-
sequent years, and then in 1990 the ULC approved a significant
revision to Article II, the article that covers intestacy, wills, and
donative transfers." The 1990 UPC has been revised several times,
with a significant revision to Article II completed in 2008.34
The 1990 UPC, as amended, gave a larger share to the surviving
spouse, and also tried to identify situations in which the decedent
would want parents or children to take some share of the estate
and not have the entire estate go to the surviving spouse. The
2008 Amendments added stepchildren as a category of potential
takers for a decedent who leaves no other heirs.3" Although the
goal of the 1990 UPC and the 2008 Amendments was to reflect
dispositive wishes of more decedents, the revisions left gaps in cov-
erage. The UPC does not cover unmarried partners or non-genetic
children who have not been adopted by the decedent, except for
the limited provision for stepchildren. For example, if two women
in a long-term, unmarried relationship raise a child that is genet-
ically related to one of them and not adopted by the other, the two
women will not inherit from each other and the child will inherit
only from his genetic mother and not from his other mother. In
addition, the UPC ignores other relationships the decedent may
have had that fall outside the definition of family followed by the
UPC.
This part examines provisions in the probate codes (the UPC
and state statutes) that apply (1) to spouses and partners, (2) to
children, and (3) to any potential heir who engaged in behavior
31. The Uniform Law Commission (ULC) is also known as the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform States Laws (NCCUSL). This Article uses the name ULC, be-
cause NCCUSL now prefers that name. See UNIF. LAW COMM'N, http://www.nccusl.org/ (last
visited Apr. 1, 2012).
32. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE (1969), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll
/archives/ulc/upc/upc 1969.pdf.
33. Revisions to the 1969 UPC (although not necessarily to the intestacy provisions)
occurred in 1975, 1982, 1987, and 1989. In 1990 the entire UPC was updated, and the new
baseline became the 1990 UPC. That version was revised in 1991, 1997, 1998, 2002, 2003,
2008, and 2011. This Article will use "1990 UPC" to mean the 1990 UPC as amended. The
Article will identify the 2008 and 2011 Amendments separately.
34. The ULC website lists seventeen states as having adopted the UPC. Legislative Fact
Sheet-Probate Code, UNIF. LAw COMM'N, www.nccus.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=
Probate%20Code (last visited Sept. 4, 2011).
35. If the estate is large, the UPC creates a share for parents when no descendant sur-
vives. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102(2) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 36-37 (Supp. 2011).
36. The Uniform Probate Code provides that if no spouse and no grandparents or de-
scendants of grandparents survive the decedent, any descendants of a deceased spouse or
spouses (step-descendants of the decedent) will take. § 2-102(1) (B), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 36
(Supp. 2011).
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that causes the heir to lose an inheritance. In connection with each
of these aspects of the intestacy statute, this Article discusses schol-
arly proposals for changes.
B. Spouses and Partners
1. Spousal Share Under the UPC
Mid-twentieth century studies showed that testators who execut-
ed wills gave more property to their surviving spouses than the
intestacy statutes would have provided." In response to these
changes in the way people viewed their families and relationships,
the 1969 UPC increased the spousal share from the share many
intestacy statutes provided at the time.3 s The 1969 UPC gave the
spouse the entire estate if the decedent left no descendants or par-
ents, and gave the spouse the first $50,000 and then one-half of the
remainder if the decedent had descendants all of whom were de-
scendants of the surviving spouse, or if one or both parents
survived the decedent." If the decedent left descendants who were
not descendants of the surviving spouse, then the spouse received
one-half and the descendants divided the other half.40
Despite the increases in the spousal share, a study published in
1978 suggested that an even greater share would be more likely to
match decedent wishes." When the UPC drafters revised the UPC
in 1990,42 they increased the share of the surviving spouse, based
on a growing acceptance of the idea that most decedents would
prefer that result.43 Under the 1990 UPC, as amended, the surviv-
ing spouse receives the entire estate if (1) the decedent left
descendants all of whom were descendants of the spouse, (2) the
decedent left no descendants or parents, or (3) the estate was
"small."44 If the decedent left parents but no descendants, the
spouse receives the first $300,000 plus three-fourths of the rest of
37. SUSSMAN, supra note 23, at 83; Allison Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of
Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 241, 251-55 (1963); see Edward H. Ward &
J.H. Beuscher, The Inheritance Process in Wisconsin, 1950 Wis. L. REv. 393, 412-15 (1950).
38. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 1, general cmt. (1969).
39. § 2-102.
40. §§ 2-102(4), 2-103(l) (1969).
41. See Fellows, supra note 4.
42. See supra note 33.
43. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 cmt. (1990) (citing numerous empirical studies).
See also Lawrence W Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights Under the Re-
vised UniformPbrobate Code, 76 IowA L. REv. 223, 229-35 (1991) (describing the theory behind
the revisions).
44. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102A(a)(1) (1990) (amended 2008).
794 [VOL. 45:4
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the estate.4 If the decedent left descendants all of whom are de-
scendants of the surviving spouse and the spouse has one or more
descendants who are not descendants of the decedent, the spouse
receives $225,000 plus one-half of the balance of the estate . If the
decedent left descendants who are not descendants of the spouse,
the spouse receives $150,000 plus half of the remaining estate of
the decedent.4 7 Thus, if an estate is less than $150,000, the spouse
will take the entire estate.
2. Proposals for Unmarried and Unregistered Partners
The number of unmarried partners in the U.S. continues to
481grow. Unmarried couples may choose not to marry for many rea-
sons given the decreasing social stigma of unmarried cohabitation.
Some couples may consider marriage a patriarchal institution that
they prefer to avoid.49 Other couples may not be legally permitted
to marry because the partners are the same sex. Still other cou-
ples may choose not to marry because marriage will cause the loss
of Social Security or other government benefits." Some unmarried
couples may be in short-term relationships, but many couples are
in long-term, committed relationships. with as much stability as
52many marriages, if not more.
45. § 2-102(a)(2).
46. § 2-102(a) (3).
47. Id.
48. Data from the 2000 census shows 4,881,377 households headed by opposite-sex
partners and 594,391 headed by same-sex partners. Tavia Simmons & Martin O'Connell,
U.S. Census Bureau, Married Couple and Unmarried Partner Households: 2000, CENSUS 2000 SPE-
CIAL REPORT 1, 4 tbl.2 (Feb. 2003), http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-5.pdf. A
similar report based on the 2010 Census has not yet been published. See 2010 CENSUS DATA
PRODUCTS: UNITED STATES, http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2010/glance
/files/AtA Glance-vl.8.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2011). But, estimates of cohabiting couples
in 2010 based on sampling, with a 90% confidence level, show 7,529,000 opposite-sex cou-
ples and 620,000 same-sex couples. Rose M. Kreider, Increase in Opposite-Sex Cohabiting Couples
from 2009 to 2010 in the Annual and Economic Supplement (ASEC) to the Current Population Survey
(CPS) 1 (Household Econ. Statistics Div., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Working Paper,
2010) available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/Inc-Opp-sex-2009-to-
2010.pdf.
49. See Fellows et al., supra note 15, at 9 (explaining that opposite-sex couples may have
rejected marriage "because of its patriarchal roots").
50. As of August 2011 only Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Iowa, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New York, and Vermont permitted same-sex couples to marry. See infra text
accompanying notes 75-83. Since then Maryland and Washington have both legalized same-
sex marriage. See http://articles.cnn.com/2012-02-23/us/us.maryland-same-sex-marriage
1_marriage-bill-marriage-law-civil-unions?_s=PM:US.
51. For other reasons couples choose not to marry, see T.P. Gallanis, Inheritance Rights
for Domestic Partners, 79 TUL. L. REv. 55, 83 (2004).
52. See id.
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Several scholars have published proposals for an intestacy provi-
sion for a domestic partner." In 1994, Lawrence Waggoner
published a multi-factor test that a court would apply to determine
whether a person meets the definition of de facto partner." To be a
de facto partner under the test, the surviving person must have
been "regularly living in the same household with the decedent in
a marriage-like relationship."55 The proposed statute lists factors
the court should consider to determine the existence of a mar-
riage-like relationship." The test involves some fact-finding, but is
sufficiently specific and nuanced to permit the determination with
reasonable ease of whether a person fits the description." The
proposal also provides that the relationship should be presumed to
be marriage-like if one or more factors exist.5" The existence of the
presumption streamlines the process of determining whether an
intestacy share should be created for the surviving partner.
Gary Spitko published his proposal in 2002.9 Professor Spitko's
proposal also creates a share for a committed partner who either
had registered with the decedent as a domestic partner under the
law of the state or demonstrates to the probate court, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the partner and decedent had lived to-
53. In addition to the three proposals described here, other articles have advocated
creating an intestate share for unmarried partners. See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 21. This
Article uses the term "domestic partner" rather than "committed partner," except when
describing proposals that use the other term. The American Law Institute's Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution use the term domestic partner, AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 6 (2002), as do at least
some of the registration statutes, see, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 106.300-344 (2011).
54. Lawrence W Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 Mo. L. REv. 21, 79-
80 (1994).
55. Id. at 79.
56. Id. at 79-80.
57. Id. (noting that the factors are "(1) the purpose, duration, constancy, and exclusiv-
ity of the relationship; (2) the degree to which the parties pooled their financial resources
... ; (3) the procreation or adoption of children and the degree of mutual care and support
given them; (4) whether the couple went through a marriage ceremony; and (5) the degree
to which the couple held themselves out to others as married or the degree to which the
couple held themselves out to others as emotionally and financially committed to one an-
other on a permanent basis, as exhibited by their acknowledging mutual rights, duties, and
obligations toward one another").
58. Id. at 80 (noting that a presumption applies if "(1) during the [six] year period
next preceding the decedent's death, the decedent and the individual lived together for
periods totaling at least [five] years; (2) the decedent and the individual registered as do-
mestic partners with and under procedures established by an organization and neither
partner executed a document terminating or purporting to terminate the registration; or
(3) the individual is the parent of a child of the decedent who, at the decedent's death, was
regularly living in the same household with the decedent and was younger than 18 years of
age.").
59. E. Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-Factor Approach to Intestate Inheritance ights for Un-
married Committed Partners, 81 OR. L. REv. 255, 345-49 (2002).
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gether "as a couple in an emotionally and physically intimate part-
nership such that the intestacy scheme should protect the
decedent's interest in donative freedom, or the surviving commit-
ted partner's reciprocity or reliance interests, by awarding to the
survivor a portion of the decedent's intestate estate."W As with Pro-
fessor Waggoner's proposal, the proposed statute provides factors
for the court to consider in determining whether the survivor was a
committed partner of the decedent.6 1
In Professor Spitko's proposal, the size of the intestate share in-
creases based on the length of time the decedent and surviving
committed partner cohabited before the decedent's death." The
share is 100 percent after fifteen years of cohabitation, except that
if the decedent left children who are not children of the surviving
partner, the share is reduced by one-half, and if the decedent had
no descendants but is survived by a parent, the share is reduced by
one-quarter.3 The share continues, but is reduced, if the partner-
ship fractured within two years of the decedent's death, unless the
partners' assets had been distributed pursuant to a contract or
statute when the partnership fractured.
In 2002 the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Trust and Estate
Acts (JEB-UTEA) asked Thomas Gallanis to prepare a study and
draft statutory language to create an intestate share for unmarried
partners.6 5 Although the JEB-UTEA decided not to recommend
that the Uniform Law Commission consider a change to the Uni-
form Probate Code, they encouraged Professor Gallanis to publish
the proposal, which he did in 2004.6 Professor Gallanis starts with
a working draft written by Professor Waggoner in 2002, and modi-
fies it by changing "committed partner" to "domestic partner" and
"marriage-like relationship" to "qualified relationship.",6 The pro-
posal uses the factor and presumption approach developed in
Professor Waggoner's proposal, with some changes in language
and the removal of the duration of the relationship as a factor."
60. Id. at 346.
61. Id. at 346-48.
62. Id. at 345. The assumption is that basing the size of the share on the length of the
relationship will be more likely to reflect the decedent's intent. The UPC uses a phased-
share based on the length of marriage in determining the elective share. UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-203, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 77-78 (Supp. 2011).
63. Spitko, supra note 59, at 345-46.
64. Id. at 346.
65. Gallanis, supra note 51, at 56.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 86-87. The term "domestic partner" was used to be consistent with AM. LAW
INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ch. 6 (2002). Id. at 56 n.3.
68. Id. at 87-90.
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Professor Gallanis notes that the factors draw from a study con-
ducted by Mary Louise Fellows69 and from the American Law
Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution.7 0 He adds,
"The proposal maintains Professor Waggoner's emphasis on factors
that rely on tangible, as opposed to oral, evidence in order to re-
duce groundless litigation."7 ' The Gallanis proposal not only
creates an intestacy share for a survivor in a "qualified relation-
ship," but also provides that wherever the word "spouse" appears in
the UPC, the words "or domestic partner" are added.
Despite the existence of these proposals, the UPC does not yet
include an intestacy provision for a surviving committed partner.
One reason the UPC does not include a provision for committed
73
partners may be political. Recognition of unmarried partners,
particularly same-sex partners, was, and continues to be,
controversial throughout the United States. The Uniform Law
Commissioners who vote to approve new uniform acts or revisions
to uniform acts come from all fifty states plus the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Although
Commissioners representing some states might view this provision
as a good addition to the UPC, others likely would not. Even if the
ULC approved the provision, many states would likely refuse to
adopt it. A second reason may be that some states now provide for
status-based inheritance by same-sex couples. In those states, a
couple can register or enter into a civil union and receive an
intestate share based on that status. As indicated in this Article,
status-based inheritance is easier to administer than inheritance
69. Fellows et al., supra note 15, at 55.
70. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 6 (2002).
71. Gallanis, supra note 51, at 90.
72. Id. Under the Gallanis proposal, a domestic partner would be covered by the elec-
tive share, UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 74-75 (Supp. 2011); the
omitted spouse provision, § 2-301, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 317 (1998); and other protections for a
surviving spouse such as a homestead allowance, § 2-402, 8 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 96 (Supp. 2011);
exempt property, § 2-403, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 97 (Supp. 2011); or family maintenance, § 2-404,
8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 98 (Supp. 2011).
73. Prof. Gallanis writes that the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Trust and Estate
Acts (JEB-UTEA) decided it did not have the authority "to approve statutory language or
even to circulate such language for broader consideration." Gallanis, supra note 51, at 56.
Although the JEB-UTEA acting on its own might not be able to approve statutory language,
it could have recommended that the ULC appoint a drafting committee to continue work
on the idea. The JEB-UTEA did so with respect to the changes to the parent-child definition
that became the focus of the 2008 Amendments. These changes were also the subject of
study by the JEB-UTEA before being considered by the Drafting Committee to Amend the
Uniform Probate Code. See Memorandum from Susan N. Gary to joint Editorial Board,
Summary of Issues: Parent-Child Relationship (Oct. 25, 2003) (hereinafter Memorandum)
(on file with author).
74. See infra text accompanying notes 75-83.
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based on a judicial determination of the existence of a relation-
ship.
From 2004, the date of the last of the three proposals, until
2011, the landscape for same-sex partners changed, at least in
some states. In 2004, three states-Hawaii (reciprocal beneficiar-
ies) ," Vermont (civil unions) , and California (registered domestic
partners) 7 7-provided some type of registration that, among other
legal consequences, granted intestacy rights for the registered per-
sons. 8 Massachusetts began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex
couples in 2004.79 By August 2011, eighteen states plus the District
of Columbia provided for intestacy rights for same-sex couples
through marriage," civil union," registered domestic partnership,S
or a designated beneficiary agreement.
Although more same-sex couples now have the option of marry-
ing or registering, the availability of marriage or registration does
not eliminate the need for an intestacy share for unmarried or un-
registered partners. First, the majority of unmarried partners are
different-sex couples. 4 They have chosen not to marry for reasons
that probably do not include a preference that the surviving
partner not inherit. For same-sex couples, the public nature of
registration may lead to a decision not to register, even in states
75. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-1 (LexisNexis 2010).
76. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (2010) (explaining that parties to a civil union
have the same benefits and responsibilities as spouses in a marriage).
77. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2012) (defining domestic partner).
Other sections throughout the California statutes codify the rules.
78. For a history of these registration statutes, see Gallanis, supra note 51, at 63-70.
79. Id. at 71-72 (describing the history of the Massachusetts decision to permit same-
sex marriage).
80. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-20 (West 2011); D.C. CODE § 46-401 (2005 &
Supp. 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.211 (West 2003); MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 190B § 2-
102 (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (2004 & Supp. 2011); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 10-a (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202 (2010); Varnum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906-07 (Iowa 2009) (extending full access to the institution of civil
marriage to same-sex couples); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70
(Mass. 2003) (declaring that exclusion of "qualified same-sex couples from access to civil
marriage violates Massachusetts law").
81. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 201-217 (West 2009); HAv. REv. STAT. §§ 572B-1 to
572B-11 (LexisNexis 2010); 750 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 75 (2009 & Supp. 2011); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 37:1-31(a) (West 2002 & Supp. 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 15-3.1 (2003 & Supp. 2011).
82. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2004 & Supp. 2012); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6401 (West
2002); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (2004 & Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-
A, § 2-102 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. § 122A.100 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 106.300-340
(2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.60.015 (2005 & Supp. 2012); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 770.001 (West
2009 & Supp. 2011).
83. Colorado permits a designated beneficiary to take an intestate share. See Co. REV.
STAT. §§ 15-11-102.5, 15-22 (2011).
84. See supra text accompanying note 48.
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that permit registration." Other couples may view registration or
marriage as heteronormative and avoid it for that reason.6 And, of
course, many states do not permit marriage or registration for
same-sex couples. For many couples, both different-sex and same-
sex, intestacy statutes based on status will not carry out their wishes.
C. Children
Although increased shares for spouses have meant decreased
shares for children in some situations, children and further de-
scendants continue to be important takers in all intestacy schemes.
When a decedent does not leave a spouse or domestic partner, de-
scendants may take the entire estate, to the exclusion of parents or
other collateral relatives. Thus, determining who will be consid-
ered a child and a descendant is important.
1. Adopted Children
a. UPC
The UPC has always included adopted children as children of
the adoptive parents." For inheritance purposes, the UPC provides
that adoption cuts off the right of inheritance between the genet-
ic" parent and child, replacing it with inheritance between the
adoptive parent and child,90 subject to an exception for adoption
by a stepparent. If "the spouse of either genetic parent" adopts a
child, the adoption will not cut off rights the child has to inherit
from and through the parent who is no longer a parent." For ex-
ample, assume that Mother and Father have a child, Son, and then
Mother and Father divorce. Mother marries Stepfather and Stepfa-
ther adopts Son. Under the UPC, Son can inherit from and
through Mother, Father, and Stepfather. Only Mother and Stepfa-
85. See Spitko, supra note 59, at n.17.
86. See Fellows, supra note 15, at 9-10.
87. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103(a) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 40 (Supp. 2011).
88. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109 (1969) (amended 2008).
89. The 1969 UPC uses the term "natural parent" to mean birth parents, who were, in
1969, the genetic parents. See id. The 1990 UPC, as amended, uses the term "genetic parent"
to mean the parents who contributed genetic material to create the child. SeeUNIF. PROBATE
CODE§ 2-115(7) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 51 (Supp. 2011). This article uses the term "genet-
ic parent" with the meaning used in the 1990 UPC, as amended.
90. See UNIE. PROBATE CODE § 2-118 to -119 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 53-55 (Supp.
2011); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109 (1969) (amended 2008).
91. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119(a)-(b) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 55 (Supp. 2011).
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ther and their relatives can inherit from Son. Some states apply the
stepparent adoption provision only if the adoption occurs after the
death of Father.9 2 In that case, it may be more likely that Father's
relatives will remain in contact with Son. If Father is alive and gives
up parental rights in order for Stepfather to adopt Son, it seems
less likely that Father and his relatives will stay in contact. The UPC
drafters took the view that over-inclusion is better than under-
inclusion and chose to provide inheritance rights for Son even if
Father voluntarily gave up parental rights.93
The structure of the UPC's adoption provision, combined with
the stepparent exception, creates a problem if an unmarried part-
ner adopts the couple's child. For example, if Genetic Mother
(GM) has a child and Adoptive Mother (GM's partner) adopts the
child, that adoption will cut off the rights of inheritance between
GM and the child. The problem is that the language of UPC § 2-
119(b) says that adoption cuts off inheritance rights between
genetic parents and the adopted child, with the stepparent adop-
tion being an exception to that general rule. The stepparent
exception applies only if the adoptive parent is "the spouse" of the
genetic parent.9 Thus, if the same-sex couple agrees to co-parent
but is not legally married, adoption by one parent cuts off inher-
itance rights for the other parent. The solution is for the genetic
parent to adopt her own child-or execute a will.
The committee that drafted the 2008 Amendments was aware of
the problem," but decided not to address the issue with a specific
exception. Without a status category for a domestic partner, an ex-
ception comparable to the stepparent exception was not feasible.
The result is that, although someone who functions as a parent can
be considered a parent for inheritance purposes,9 7 a genetic parent
whose child is adopted by anyone other than a spouse is specifically
excluded from being considered a parent.
The 2008 Amendments added a number of new exceptions to the
adoption provisions."9 A person will continue to be treated as the
92. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 112.175(2)(b) (2011).
93. Neither type of statute actually considers whether the parent and the parent's fami-
ly have continued to have a relationship with the child.
94. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119(b) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 55 (Supp. 2011).
95. Id.
96. See Memorandum, supra note 73.
97. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-121(d) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 62-63 (Supp.
2011).
98. § 2-119, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 55 (Supp. 2011).
99. See Susan N. Gary, We Are Family: The Definition of Parent and Child for Succession Pur-
poses, 34 ACTEC J. 171, 176 (2008); Sheldon F. Kurtz & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC
Addresses the Class-Gift and Intestacy Rights of Children of Assisted Reproduction Technologies, 35
ACTEC J. 30, 30-33 (2009); Lee-Ford Tritt, Sperms and Estates: An Unadulterated Functionally
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child of his genetic parents (or parents as determined under the
UPC rules for determining the parent-child relationship of a child
conceived using assisted reproductive technology or original adop-
tive parents) if a relative or the spouse of a relative of either of his
genetic parents adopts him. 00 "Relative" is defined to mean a de-
scendant of the grandparent of the child.'01 Parental status will also
continue if a child is adopted after the death of her parents, even if
the adoption is a stranger adoption.o2 In both cases the reason for
the exception is an assumption that a relationship will continue be-
tween the child and the relatives of the former parent, but the
statute does not require evidence of a functional relationship.
b. State Intestacy Statutes
The intestacy statute in Texas provides that adoption does not
cut off inheritance rights between a child and his genetic parents.
This statute goes beyond the UPC and provides for inheritance
through genetic parents regardless of whether the adoptive parents
are related to the genetic parents. A child adopted at birth by per-
sons unrelated to her genetic parents, sometimes referred to as an
adopted-out child, can still inherit from her genetic parents if she
can identify them.os
Pennsylvania's intestacy statute considers the functional nature
of an adopted child's relationship with his genetic family. The
Pennsylvania statute limits inheritance by an adopted-out child to
situations in which the person whose estate is being distributed
"maintained a family relationship with the adopted person."'04 The
Pennsylvania statute applies to stepparent adoptions and to adop-
tions by a relative of the child's legal parent.' Pennsylvania does
not include a provision similar to UPC § 2-119(d) that provides for
continuing inheritance rights if a non-relative adopts a child after
the death of both parents. The Pennsylvania statute does not pro-
vide a bright-line rule but instead allows a court to limit
Based Approach to Parent-Child Property Succession, 62 SMU L. REv. 367, 407-13 (2009) [herein-
after Tritt, Functionally Based Approach] ("The fixation on providing for as many children as
possible has created a complicated, inconsistent system."); Lee-Ford Tritt, Technical Correction
or Tectonic Shift: Competing Default Rule Theories under the New Uniform Probate Code, 61 ALA. L.
REv. 273, 300-12 (2010) [hereinafter Tritt, Competing Theories].
100. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119(c) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 55 (Supp. 2011).
101. § 2-115(9), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 51 (Supp. 2011).
102. § 2-119(d), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 55 (Supp. 2011).
103. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 40 (West 2011).
104. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2108 (West 2005 & Supp. 2011).
105. Id.
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inheritance to situations in which the child and a relative of the
child's genetic parent had maintained contact. If the goal is to car-
ry out the intent of the hypothetical decedent, Pennsylvania's
statute may be more likely to do so than the UPC.
2. Assisted Reproductive Technology
In an attempt to address new ways of creating a child using as-
sisted reproductive technology, the 2008 Amendments adopted a
complicated set of rules to determine whether a person involved in
the creation of a child-a genetic donor, a surrogate mother, or an
intentional parent-will be considered a parent for purposes of the
intestacy statutes.1 o6 The rules are similar to those that apply under
the Uniform Parentage Act, but they are not identical. The conse-
quence is that a child could be a child under one statute but not
under the other. 107
A particular issue within the subject of assisted reproductive
technology is the conception of a child after the death of the
child's genetic mother or father.' Three early cases involving
posthumously conceived children determined that the child or
children qualified under the state intestacy statutes as children of
the deceased parent for purposes of determining eligibility for So-
cial Security benefits.o The cases addressed three elements: proof
106. For analyses of the new parent-child definition, see Gary, supra note 99; Kurtz &
Waggoner, supra note 99; Tritt, Functionally Based Approach, supra note 99. See also Kristine S.
Knaplund, Children of Assisted Reproduction, 45 U. MICH..J.L. REFORM 899 (2012).
107. See Gary, supra note 99, at 174-77, 180-84 (identifying differences between the
UPA and the 2008 Amendments).
108. Numerous articles discuss legal issues relating to posthumously conceived chil-
dren. See, e.g., Ronald Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent: A Dialog on Postmortem Conception,
Parental Responsibility, and Inheritance, 33 Hous. L. REV. 967 (1996); Joseph H. Karlin, Com-
ment, "Daddy, Can You Spare A Dime?": Intestate Heir Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children,
79 TEMP. L. REv. 1317 (2006); RobertJ. Kerekes, My Child ... But Not My Heir: Technology, the
Law and Post-Mortem Conception, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 213 (1996); Charles P. Kin-
dregan, Dead Dads: Thawing an Heir from the Freezer, 35 Wm. MITCHELL L. REv. 433 (2009);
Kristine S. Knaplund, Postmortem Conception and a Father's Last Will, 46 ARiz. L. REV. 91
(2004); Browne Lewis, Graveside Birthday Parties: The Legal Consequences of Forming Families
Posthumously, 60 CASE V. REs. L. REV. 1159 (2010); Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Conceiving the
Inconceivable: Legal Recognition of the Posthumously Conceived Child, 34 ACTEC J. 154 (2008); see
also Knaplund, supra, at 102-03 (citing numerous additional articles concerning posthu-
mous conception and inheritance).
109. See Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Ariz. 2002); Woodward v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec. 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002); In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257,
1263-64 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). In one case, In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S. 2d 207 (N.Y.
Cnty. Surr. Ct. 2007), the determination of a parent-child relationship was necessary to
determine a child's right to receive distributions under a trust that provided for distributions
to "issue" of the grantor, whose son was the deceased father of the posthumously conceived
children. Id. at 208.
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of the genetic relationship, consent of the deceased parent to the
use of the genetic material to create a child, and the length of time
between the death of the parent and the birth of the child. Several
more recent cases have determined that the posthumously con-
ceived child is not a child of the deceased father.no All of these
cases depend on interpretations of state intestacy statutes. As
Charles Kindregan has written, "at least for Social Security purpos-
es state inheritance law must either expressly allow for posthumous
conception of a child or contain language which is sufficiently
vague to permit such an interpretation."'
The 2008 Amendments provide that a child conceived posthu-
mously will be considered a child of the deceased parent if (1) the
decedent deposited the sperm or eggs used to create the child (the
genetic relationship), and (2) the child is in utero not later than
thirty-six months after the parent's death or is born not later than
forty-five months after the parent's death."'2 The element of con-
sent is also required, but if the genetic parents were married-and
if the surviving parent is the birth mother or if the surviving parent
functions as a parent within two years of the child's birth-then
consent is presumed. Hence, unless there is clear and convincing
evidence that a deceased genetic parent did not intend to be treat-
ed as a parent of the child, he or she will be treated as a parent."- If
the presumption does not apply, consent can be established by
facts and circumstances that establish the deceased parent's in-
tent."4 If the survivor is the birth mother and the parents were not
married, then the survivor can show that the father intended to
function as a parent to the child but was prevented from doing so
by death."5 Evidence that the decedent deposited genetic material,
combined with testimony of the survivor that the two of them had
110. See, e.g., Stephen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1265 (M.D. Fla.
2005); Finley v. Austrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 854-55 (Ark. 2008) (involving implantation of an
embryo after a husband's death); Khabbaz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 930 A.2d 1180, 1180-81
(N.H. 2007).
111. Kindregan, supra note 108, at 446.
112. The comments explain, "The 36-month period in subsection (k) is designed to al-
low a surviving spouse or partner a period of grieving, time to make up his or her mind
about whether to go forward with assisted reproduction, and a reasonable allowance for
unsuccessful attempts to achieve a pregnancy. The 36-month period also coincides with
Section 3-1006, under which an heir is allowed to recover property improperly distributed or
its value from any distributee during the later of three years after the decedent's death or
one year after distribution." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k) cmt. (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at
62 (Stipp. 2011). The 45-month period creates certainty if the date of conception is uncer-
tain.
113. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-120(h)(2), -121(f) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 58, 63
(Supp. 2011).
114. § 2-121(e)(2), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 63 (Supp. 2011).
115. §2-120(f)(2) (B), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 58 (Supp. 2011).
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talked about using the material to have children, will probably suf-
fice. The UPC does not require evidence that the decedent
considered or consented to being treated as a parent of a child
conceived posthumously.
The UPC definition of "child conceived posthumously" will like-
ly result in a finding of parentage in any posthumous conception
case.'16 The relative ease of finding consent under the UPC differs
from the requirement in the Uniform Parentage Act and the
American Bar Association's Model Act Governing Assisted Repro-
ductive Technology (February 2008) that the deceased parent give
consent, in writing, specifically for posthumous conception."'
3. Stepchildren
Under a provision added in the 2008 Amendments, step-
descendants will be intestate heirs if the decedent left no other
heirs; otherwise, the property will escheat to the state."8 Five states
have a similar provision"' and seven states provide that the de-
ceased spouse's heirs will take to avoid escheat.2 1 Only one state,
California, gives a stepchild a child's intestate share, and even then
only under limited circumstances. 2 ' The California statute provides
that a stepchild (or foster child) will be treated as a child of the
stepparent if the parent-child relationship began while the child
was a minor, the relationship continued through the joint lifetimes
of the parent and child, and adoption would have occurred but for
116. See Knaplund, supra note 108, at 100 (explaining that the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5 cmt. 1 (1999) reaches this result); see
also Knaplund, supra note 106 (pointing out that the presumption of consent if the
decedent was married to the living parent applies even if genetic material was harvested
post-mortem).
117. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (2002), 9B U.L.A. 73 (Supp. 2011); MODEL ACT Gov-
ERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECHS. § 607 (2009), available at http://apps.americanbar.org
/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf.
118. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103(b) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 40 (Supp. 2011).
119. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402(e) (West 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-
439(a) (4) (West 2004); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-104(e) (LexisNexis 2011); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06(j) (LexisNexis 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-103(6) (2009).
120. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-215(2) (2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.103(5) (West
2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.219(6) (West 2003); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 391.010(6) (Lex-
isNexis 2010); Mo. REv. STAT. § 474.010(3) (2000); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 33-1-3 (2011); VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.1-1(11) (2007). The Washington statute provides that if a person leaves
property to his surviving spouse, and the surviving spouse later dies intestate and without
heirs, the property received from the first spouse to die will go to that spouse's descendants
(the step-descendants of the second spouse to die). See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.04.095
(West 2005 & Supp. 2012).
121. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West 2002).
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a legal barrier to adoption.' Usually the legal barrier is the other
parent's refusal to relinquish parental rights; after the child reach-
es age eighteen, the barrier vanishes. After the age of eighteen, the
stepparent and child may no longer be concerned about adoption,
so this statute applies primarily when a child is still under the age
of eighteen when the stepparent dies.12 1
Most intestacy statutes ignore other step-relatives. 2 4 A stepparent
may have played a significant parental role in a child's life, but if
the stepparent did not adopt the child and the child dies, the step-
parent will not inherit. Other step-relatives of the child, such as
siblings, aunts and uncles, and grandparents, do not come within
any intestacy statute.
4. Grandchildren
Assuming that a grandchild fits the statutory definition of
"child" with respect to his parent, and assuming that the parent fits
that definition with respect to his own parent, the grandchild will
be a descendant of the grandparent. Thus, if the grandchild's par-
ent predeceases the grandparent, the grandchild will receive an
intestate share of the grandparent's estate. 2 6 A problem for some
families, however, is that a grandparent may be raising a
grandchild because the parent is incarcerated or is an unfit parent
because of drug use or other issues.1 2' The arrangement may be
informal, but it may last for many years. The grandparent may pre-
fer that any assets she has go to the grandchild rather than to the
parent. The grandchild's needs for the assets may be greater than
122. See Estate ofJoseph v. Joseph, 949 P.2d 472, 475 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1998)
(construing the requirement of a legal barrier to adoption as an ongoing requirement).
123. For an explanation of the California statute, see Gary, supra note 3, at 58-63; Mar-
garet M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate Succession and Wills, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
917, 925 (1989).
124. Carolyn R. Glick, Note, The Spousal Share in Intestate Succession: Stepparents Are Getting
Shortchanged, 74 MINN. L. REv. 631, 646 (1990) (explaining that laws that provide for inher-
itance for biological family members typically are not extended outside of those immediate
family members, and do not include individuals such as stepparents).
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103(a) (1) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 40 (Supp.
2011).
127. See Kristine S. Knaplund, Grandparents Raising Grandchildren and the Implications for
Inheritance, 46 ARIz. L. REv. 1, 2-5 (2006) (providing statistics regarding grandparents rais-
ing grandchildren, including numbers, demographics, and the duration of the
arrangements); Michelle Harris, Why a Limited Family Maintenance System Could Help American
"Grandfamilies": A Response to Kristine Knaplund's Article on Intestacy Laws and Their Implications
for Grandparents Raising Grandchildren, 3 NAELA STUDENT J. 239, 243-45 (2007) (providing
data about grandfamilies showing their numbers are increasing).
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the needs of the parent, and the grandchild may be left without
support if the grandchild is a minor when the grandparent dies.
Grandparents often choose not to adopt the grandchildren, per-
haps because they assume the arrangement will be temporary,
because they do not want to force a child to give up parental rights,
or simply because doing so does not seem necessary. To further
complicate this situation, many of the families operating in this
informal way may have modest or low incomes and may not have a
will.128
5. Other Informal Child-Rearing
Some ethnic and racial groups have family norms that involve
caring for children who are extended family members. Informal
adoption without legal documentation developed among African
American families as a way to deal with impoverished circumstanc-
es in the years following the abolition of slavery.1' A family might
care for a niece, nephew, grandchild, or other child who needs as-
sistance. American Indian and Latino cultures in the United States
also have strong traditions of "kinship caregiving., 130 Adults in
these cultures often choose to adopt caregiving roles without
taking legal steps to adopt children who need care.
D. Limits on Inheritance-Bad Behavior
1. Slayer Statutes
One way in which statutes incorporate a functional element into
the definition of intestate heirs is to eliminate intestate shares
based on certain types of bad behavior. UPC § 2-803 provides that
an heir who "feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent" will
be treated as if the heir disclaimed the intestate share.3 The stat-
ute requires a civil determination of felonious and intentional
128. See Harris, supra note 127, at 244-45 (noting that many grandparent caregivers are
members of racial minority groups, particularly African Americans, and that fact "is probably
indicative of increased intestacy rates" among grandparent caregivers). Harris cites statistical
data with respect to age and poverty that may also indicate a greater likelihood of intestacy
among grandparent caregivers. See id. at 243-44.
129. See ROBERT B. HILL, INFORMAL ADOPTION AMONG BLACK FAMILIEs 24 (1977); Za-
nita E. Fenton, In a World Not Their Own: The Adoption of Black Children, 10 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 39, 43-44 (1993); Harris, supra note 127, at 245.
130. See Foster, supra note 5, at 246 (citing, among other sources, Elvia R. Arriola, Law
and the Family of Choice and Need, 35 U. LOuISVILLEJ. FAM. L. 691, 696-97 (1997)).
131. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(b) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 173 (Supp. 2011).
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killing, not a criminal conviction.1 3' Thus, the court will consider
evidence based on a preponderance of the evidence standard.1 3 3 All
states have case law or statutes that bar a "slayer" from inheriting
from the decedent he killed."03 4
2. Parental Abandonment of Child
A second type of behavior-based statute denies inheritance to a
parent who abandoned or refused to support a child. The 2008
Amendments added a provision that bars a parent from inheriting
from or through a child if the child dies before age eighteen, and
if there is clear and convincing evidence that the parent's parental
rights could have been terminated for "nonsupport, abandonment,
abuse, neglect; or other actions or inactions" under the law of the
state.1 35 The new provision prevents a parent who refuses to support
a child from inheriting, but only if the child dies before the child
reaches age eighteen. 3 6 The requirement that the child die before
age eighteen probably relates to the difficulty of proving that the
parent's parental rights would have been terminated at some point
long before the child's death, and also to the fact that after age
eighteen, the child can execute a will disinheriting the parent. This
limitation means that a genetic parent who abandoned a child at
birth could, unless parental rights were terminated at some point,
surface at the child's death thirty years later and inherit a share of
the child's estate.
Twenty-three states have statutes that bar inheritance by a parent
who abandons or refuses to support a minor child.3 Most of these
statutes deny inheritance in the case of abandonment, assuming
the conditions for denial exist, but two states give the court discre-
132. § 2-803(g), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 173 (Supp. 2011). Ajudgment of conviction for felo-
nious and intentional killing conclusively establishes the convicted person as the decedent's
killer for purposes of losing the inheritance. Id.
133. Id.
134. SeeAnne-Marie Rhodes, Consequences ofHeirs' Misconduct: Moving from Rules to Discre-
tion, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 975, 979-82 (2007) (describing the history of slayer statutes and
citing statutes or cases in all states that bar inheritance by a slayer); see also Mary Louise Fel-
lows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter of Equity, 71 IOWA L. REv. 489, 496-504 (1986);
William M. McGovern, Jr., Homicide and Succession to Property, 68 MICH. L. REv. 65, 65-75
(1969).
135. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(a) (2) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 48 (Supp. 2011).
136. Id.
137. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5 cmts.
2, 14 (1999). See also Monopoli, supra note 18, at 267-70 (1994) (describing statutes barring
parents from inheritance in cases of abandonment or failure to support); Rhodes, supra
note 134, at 983-85.
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tion to determine whether the parent's share should be reduced.
In Illinois, the parent's share will be reduced unless the court de-
cides, based on the effect of the abandonment on the child, to give
the parent a reduced benefit "as the interests of justice require."3 s
In South Carolina, the denial of inheritance occurs only if the
other parent or some other interested party petitions the court to
reduce or deny the inheritance.' 1 Thus, in these two states, judicial
discretion already exists with respect to parental abandonment.
3. Spousal Abandonment
Several states bar inheritance if the decedent's spouse lived in
adultery, abandoned the decedent, or refused to support the dece-
dent.14 These statutes derive from early English statutes that barred
a woman living in adultery from obtaining dower.4 1 The statutes
typically provide that if one spouse abandoned the other spouse
for a period of time, but they then resumed their marital relation-
ship, the denial of inheritance will not apply.'4 ' Now that spouses
can dissolve their marriage and cut off inheritance rights, most
states have removed these statutes and the UPC does not include
h* * *143this provision.
4. Elder Abuse
Four states have statutes barring inheritance by someone who
abused an elder or dependent adult. The California, Illinois, and
Oregon rules all apply to both financial and physical abuse, while
the Maryland statute applies only to financial abuse.'" The statutes
also vary as to whether a conviction of abuse is required for appli-
cation of the statute. The California statute defines abuse to
138. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-6.5 (West 2007).
139. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-114 (2009).
140. For an excellent analysis of the adultery statutes and the abandonment statutes, see
Rhodes, supra note 134, at 978-79. Professor Rhodes cites five states-Indiana, Kentucky,
Missouri, North Carolina, and Ohio-with adultery statutes. See id. at 978 n.15. She cites
nine states with abandonment statutes-Connecticut, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia-and adds that Hawaii
and Massachusetts acknowledge spousal abandonment. See id. at 982 n.35.
141. See id. at 978.
142. See id. at 983.
143. See id. at 979, 983.
144. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/2-6.2 (West 2007 & Supp. 2011); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 8-801(e) (LexisNexis 2002
& Supp. 2011); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 112.455-465 (2011).
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include "physical abuse, neglect, or fiduciary abuse of the dece-
dent, who was an elder or dependent adult."1 4" The California
statute applies if the abuse and some additional factors are proved
by clear and convincing evidence, or the heir was convicted of
abuse under the California Penal Code.' Illinois requires a convic-
tion of abuse, either physical or financial, and then provides that if
the heir proves by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent
"knew of the conviction and subsequent to the conviction ex-
pressed or ratified his or her intent to transfer the property"'4 7 to
the heir, the court can decide to allow all or part of the inher-
itance. Oregon requires a conviction of elder abuse within five
years of the decedent's death for application of the statute.'4 1 If the
conviction occurred more than five years before the decedent's
death, the statute will not apply, presumably because the legislature
decided that five years is enough time for the decedent to write a
will disinheriting the abuser."'9 Maryland's statute denies inher-
itance if the heir was convicted of a financial crime against the
decedent and did not fully restore the value of the property tak-
150en.
II. REASONS TO CONSIDER GUIDED DISCRETION
A. Complexity Is Not Working
The Uniform Law Commission (ULC) website lists only eighteen
states as having adopted some version of the UPC. The UPC has
likely influenced states not listed as "UPC states," but the more re-
cent changes to the intestacy provisions have not been widely
145. CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012).
146. CAL. PROB. CODE § 259(a)(1) (West 2002 & Supp. 2012). The other requirements
for denial of inheritance are the following:
(2) The person is found to have acted in bad faith.
(3) The person has been found to have been reckless, oppressive, fraudu-
lent, or malicious in the commission of any of these acts upon the
decedent.
(4) The decedent, at the time those acts occurred and thereafter until the
time of his or her death, has been found to have been substantially un-
able to manage his or her financial resources or to resist fraud or
undue influence.
147. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-6.2(b) (West 2007 & Supp. 2011).
148. OR. REv. STAT. § 112.455 (2011).
149. The statute does not apply after five years elapses, even if the decedent lacked the
capacity to execute a will. § 112.455(b).
150. SeeMD. CODE ANN., CRIm LAw § 8-801(e) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2011).
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adopted. One problem may be the increasing complexity of the
UPC.151
The UPC drafters continue to tweak the UPC, trying to get clos-
er and closer to a hypothetical decedent's wishes. As the drafters
try to address more possible scenarios-multiple marriages, ART
children, abusive heirs-the number of scenarios continues to ex-
pand. An intestacy statute has always been a one-size-fits-all
proposition, and even with the increasing numbers of provisions
that try to fine-tune the application of the intestacy code, the stat-
utes may be less likely rather than more likely to match what the
decedent wanted.1 52
If complexity is not working, then what is the answer? One solu-
tion is for more people to execute wills.153 A will provides the best
evidence of a decedent's intent, and when a decedent has a will,
the intestacy statute, with its inevitable flaws, will be unnecessary.
The problem, of course, is that people continue to die intestate,
despite efforts by the ULC and state legislatures to decrease the
likelihood that probate law will refuse to give effect to wills based
on errors in execution.15
An alternative to consider is an intestacy statute that would give
the probate court a modicum of discretion in the face of changing
family dynamics. This Article proposes using a relatively straight-
forward intestacy statute, with a rebuttable presumption that the
statute applies. The statute would create several categories of po-
tential heirs and describe each category through a list of factors for
the court to consider. The factors would guide the court in deter-
mining whether a person should qualify for an intestate share.
Under the proposed statute, a potential heir could challenge the
application of the statute by presenting evidence that showed that
the decedent would have preferred a different result, or that based
on the needs of the presumptive heirs and the potential heirs, a
different result would be appropriate. The statute would deny a
share for an heir who murdered the decedent, but would allow the
151. See Mark L. Ascher, The 1990 Unifonm Probate Code: Older and Better or More Like the
Internal Revenue Code? 77 MINN. L. REv. 639, 640 (1993) (describing the "compulsion to deal
individually with every conceivable variation" and complaining that the 1990 UPC, in con-
trast with the pre-1990 UPC, is "complex and wordy").
152. See Tritt, Functionally Based Approach, supra note 99, at 407 (describing the UPC def-
inition of parent and child after the 2008 Amendments as "the kitchen-sink approach" with
rules that are "overly complicated and ideologically inconsistent").
153. Professor Knaplund makes this recommendation as a way to address the issue of
grandparents raising grandchildren. See Knaplund, supra note 127, at 21.
154. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 108 (Supp. 2011); John
H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia's Tranquil
Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1987).
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court to provide for a share if circumstances warranted doing so.
The statute would permit the court to deny or reduce a share for
an heir who abused or did not support the decedent, or to create
or increase a share for a person who had a close, long-term rela-
tionship with the decedent. The statute would provide guidance
for the court to consider in reaching its determination.
The advantages of guided discretion are several. Discretion may
make effectuating the decedent's intention more likely. Discretion
avoids trying to pin down every possible variation, which inevitably
* * 155results in over-inclusion in some cases and under-inclusion in
others.1 "6 Through guided discretion, a court can address the needs
of survivors, deny inheritance to those who mistreated the dece-
dent, and provide some amount for those who aided the decedent.
The goal is to improve results for intestate decedents and their
families without unduly increasing administrative costs and bur-
dens on the courts.
B. Discretion Is Already in Use in the United States
The idea of using discretion in intestacy statutes is not new. The
UPC and some states already permit a degree ofjudicial discretion
in limited circumstances. The UPC uses discretion in its parent-
child definition by including in the definition of "parent" a person
who "functioned as a parent" of a child born using assisted repro-
ductive technology. Pennsylvania uses discretion in connection
with children who have been adopted out, providing that after a
child's adoption, the child will still be considered to have a rela-
tionship for inheritance purposes if the child has a relationship for
family purposes." Both provisions make inheritance depend on
proof of a functional relationship, rather than status.
Courts in a few states have discretion to alter intestate shares for
bad behavior. In California a court can deny an inheritance based
on proof that the heir abused the decedent, financially or physical-
155. Most states and the UPC include, as an heir of a person who dies after reaching
the age of majority, the genetic parent who was not involved in raising the child. See, e.g.,
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(a) (2) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 48 (Supp. 2011).
156. Unmarried and unregistered domestic partners are not included. See supra text ac-
companying notes 73-83. The genetic child of a mother whose unmarried and unregistered
domestic partner adopted the child is not an heir of the genetic mother. See supra text ac-
companying notes 89-90.
157. The proposal will permit inheritance by people beyond the decedent's family. See
infra text accompanying notes 209-211.
158. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f) (2) (2011), 8 U.LA. pt. I, at 58 (Supp. 2011).
159. 20 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN. § 2108 (West 2005).
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ly.'" In Illinois, a parent cannot inherit from a child that the parent
abandoned, but the court can decide to give the parent a reduced
share "as the interests of justice require."'6 ' In Wisconsin, a slayer
loses her inheritance, but an exception exists if "[t]he court finds
that, under the factual situation created by the killing, the dece-
dent's wishes would best be carried out by means of another
disposition of the property."6 2
A few states recognize common law marriage and will treat as le-
gally married a man and woman who functioned as if they were
married."3 These states usually require that the couple agree to
enter into a marital relationship,'" and then demand other evi-
dence that they considered themselves married. For example,
many states require that the couple lives together and some re-
quire that they hold themselves out as married.' The court must
determine whether they functioned as a married couple. A couple
treated as married will be treated as spouses for intestacy purpos-
166es.
The fact that discretion currently is used, at least to a limited
degree, suggests two things. First, the drafters of the UPC and legis-
latures have accepted the idea that some degree of judicial
discretion is useful. Second, courts appear to be using these provi-
sions without generating backlash or arguments about the results.
C. Family Maintenance-Discretion Used in Commonwealth Countries
A number of common law jurisdictions outside the United States
use a form of judicial discretion in probate called "family mainte-
nance" (also called testator's family maintenance or decedent's
family maintenance).' New Zealand adopted a family maintenance
160. CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012).
161. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-6.5 (West 2007).
162. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 854.14(6)(a) (West 2002 & Supp. 2011).
163. See Sol Lovas, When Is a Family Not a Family? Inheritance and the Taxation of Inheritance
Within the Non-Traditional Family, 24 IDAHO L. REv. 353, 360-61 (1988) (describing the histo-
ry of common law marriage and citing a number of cases recognizing common law
marriage).
164. See id. at 361.
165. See id.
166. Prof. Lovas also notes that Nevada recognizes marriages entered into by Quakers
and Indians that comply with religious customs but may not comply with Nevada's legal rules
for marriage. Id. at 360 n.51; see also NEv. REV. STAT. § 122.150 (2011) (Quakers); id.
§ 122.170 (Indians).
167. For explanations of family maintenance, see Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and
the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 83, 121-26 (1994); Frances H. Foster, Linking
Support and Inheritance: A New Model from China, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 1199, 1210-11; Hargis,
supra note 16, at 456-63 (describing the differences among the countries that have adopted
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statute in 1900. Following New Zealand's lead, England, all of the
Australian provinces, and most of the Canadian provinces adopted
family maintenance provisions.as Family maintenance allows a fam-
ily member, as defined in the statute, to petition the court for a
larger share of a decedent's estate. The court can modify the dis-
tribution of assets that would otherwise occur either under a will or
through intestacy.70 The persons who can petition include a surviv-
ing spouse and a child or descendant who was dependent on the
decedent.'7 1 Some statutes include same-sex partners, and some
explicitly do not.'7 2 The English statute includes anyone dependent
on the decedent when the decedent dies.'7 3 The statutes provide
factors for the court to consider, usually including the decedent's
intent, the applicant's financial needs, and the relationship be-
tween the decedent and the applicant.7 4 The court determines the
amount of the award based on the survivor's financial dependency
on the decedent and need for support."
American scholars have recommended family maintenance,7 6
but these proposals have generated little interest and some con-
cern.'7 7 Criticism of family maintenance focuses on the ability of a
testator's family maintenance, including the degree of discretion, the factors the court may
or must consider, and the persons who can apply).
168. See Hargis, supra note 16, at 456-57.
169. See id. at 457 (citing family maintenance statutes at n. 65).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 459-60.
172. Jennifer Hargis explains that Ontario permits a same-sex partner to apply; Manito-
ba and the Yukon allow only an opposite-sex partner to apply; and England provides that a
same-sex partner may apply, but only if the person was a "dependant" of the decedent. See
Hargis, supra note 16, at 460 & nn.75-77.
173. Id. at 459-60.
174. See id. at 458-59.
175. See id. at 458-62.
176. See, e.g., Ronald Chester, Disinheritance and the American Child: An Alternative from
British Columbia, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 1, 32-35 (proposing discretionary statute based on the
British Columbia statute); Edwin M. Epstein, Testamentary Capacity, Reasonableness and Family
Maintenance: A Proposal for Meaningful Reforn, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 231, 249-53 (1962); John T.
Gaubatz, supra note 14, at 558; Hargis, supra note 16, at 466-67; Harris, supra note 126, at
260-63 (recommending family maintenance for dependent minors and incompetents
whose sole caregiver died);Joseph Laufer, Flexible Restraints on Testamentary Freedom-A Report
on Decedents' Family Maintenance Legislation, 69 HARv. L. REv. 277, 277-81 (1955);Jan Ellen
Rein, A More Rational System for the Protection of Family Members Against Disinheritance: A Critique
of Washington's Pretermitted Child Statute and Other Matters, 15 GoNz. L. REv. 11, 44-55 (1979)
(proposing discretion based on the New Zealand statute).
177. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law
and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REv. 1165, 1186-91 (1986). For a summary of the literature
and arguments against family maintenance models, see Foster, supra note 167, at 1204-05,
1214-16; Harris, supra note 127, at 252-59 (reviewing scholarly comments, both negative
and positive, about family maintenance).
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judge to rewrite a will and disrupt a testator's intent."' Although
family maintenance permits a judge to change the result of the in-
testacy statute, a typical case involves an applicant who would have
inherited under intestacy-a spouse or a child-but was disinherit-
ed under the will." 9 Americans tend to place a high priority on
freedom of testation, so permitting a judge to change a testator's
expressed intent raises concerns. A particular concern is that a
judge-typically a member of the majoritarian society-could be
making decisions about a family that did not conform to expecta-
tions that accompany a traditional American family structure.
Family maintenance applied to testate decedents is unappealing
in the American context, but if limited to intestate decedents, fami-
ly maintenance can provide useful insights.'so Problems with
discretion have not been reported, and it appears that judges in
the jurisdictions with family maintenance provisions use the discre-
tion to reach fair results. As Jennifer Hargis writes:
The statutes in [England, Manitoba, and Ontario] require
courts to consider specific factors in determining whether and
how much to give an applicant. This limits the court's discre-
tion, and provides courts guidance so that results are fair and
consistent.181
Ms. Hargis notes that the only problem identified with family
maintenance proceedings in England has been the possibility of
depletion of the estate because of costs of litigation.18 2 Ontario ad-
dresses this concern by granting courts discretion to award costs of
the litigation against either the estate or the applicant.8
D. Proposals for Discretion for Intestacy Statutes
In recent years, scholars have recommended judicial discretion
to address problems with the intestacy statutes. 1 One of the
178. See Harris, supra note 127, at 252-53.
179. See Hargis, supra note 16, at 461 (noting that in Manitoba, all family maintenance
cases since 1990 have involved disinheritance under a will).
180. See Harris, supra note 127, at 259-60 (advocating family maintenance in intestacy).
181. Hargis, supra note 16, at 460.
182. Id. at 462; see also Gaubatz, supra note 14, at 547.
183. Hargis, supra note 16, at 462-63.
184. For an extensive review of proposals aimed at inheritance law, including but not
limited to intestacy law, see Foster, supra note 5, at 222-34. Prof. Foster explains that scholar-
ly reform proposals "take the form of three broad strategies. They seek to (1) enhance
protections for surviving family members; (2) redefine the family to reflect changes in
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earliest advocates was John Gaubatz. In 1977, Professor Gaubatz
wrote, "There are many common fact patterns where the decedent
and his family do not fit the normal family model. In these situa-
tions the law is at best inadequate and at worst unjust."5' He noted
that "piecemeal changes" by the Uniform Probate Code (1969)
improved the Probate Code but were "inherently inadequate to
solve the basic problems."1 8 6' He proposed two solutions: providing
flexibility "to allow effective response to the abnormal inheritance
situation," and validating "as many forms of testamentary expres-
sion as possible.",1 7 The UPC has made progress on the latter of
Professor Gaubatz's suggestions,'8" but the UPC does not yet pro-
vide the flexibility in the distribution of property that Professor
Gaubatz advocated. Professor Gaubatz notes that the drafters of
the 1969 UPC attempted to approximate the intent of intestate de-
cedents when they set up the intestate shares, "and there is no
reason to believe that a court scrutinizing one family would do less
well than did the drafters when they guessed at the intentions of all
American decedents."189
Several more recent proposals have recommended creating a
category for inheritance based on whether a survivor functioned as
a family member. By requiring courts to determine whether the
decedent and survivor had a functional relationship of a particular
sort, these proposals, if adopted, would inject guided discretion
into the intestacy statutes.
Professor Waggoner, Professor Spitko, and Professor Gallanis
have all developed proposals that create an intestate share for a
domestic partner, with that person defined not by formal status but
by behavior.o These proposals operate by creating a new category
modern American society; or (3) introduce procedural mechanisms to mitigate the effects
of the family paradigm on wills that deviate from 'natural' intestacy patterns." Id. at 222.
185. Gaubatz, supra note 14, at 556. Prof. Gaubatz points out that under intestacy stat-
utes, children inherit equally even if one needs the assets and the others do not. Id. at 449. A
husband who has abandoned but not divorced his wife inherits in the same way as a husband
who remained in a close relationship with his wife. Id. at 450. A foster child being raised by
the decedent will not inherit at all, and a grandchild or niece being raised by the decedent
will not inherit unless the rest of the family structure just happens to make the child an heir.
Id. at 549.
186. Id. at 557.
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 108 (Supp. 2011)
(validating a will with defects in execution formalities if the testator intended the document
to be a will).
189. Gaubatz, supra note 14, at 560.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 48-73. Paul Buser suggests a different approach.
He urges the use of Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976), to argue for an equitable
remedy in probate for a surviving domestic partner. Paul J. Buser, Domestic Partner and Non-
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of intestate taker, providing factors to guide the court in determin-
ing whether a person fits the category, and using presumptions to
facilitate administration.''
Several proposals address the parent-child definition for intesta-
cy. Margaret Mahoney recommended an intestate share for
stepchildren, stepparents, and the descendants of the stepchildren,
if the stepfamily formed while the child was a minor and a de facto
parent-child relationship existed through their joint lifetimes.9 2
This author expanded that idea to create a functional test for the
definitions of parent and child.' Anne-Marie Rhodes argued for a
functional definition that would focus on positive acts of responsi-
bility, favoring a caring parent over an abandoning parent.9 4 Irene
Johnson proposes adding to the intestacy definition of child a per-
son "raised in the family" of the decedent." Her proposal would
require that the child live with the parent for at least half of the
child's minority, or if the parent died before the child turned
eighteen, half of the child's life.'"9 Most recently, Lee-ford Tritt has
advocated a solely functional parent-child definition to replace the
current "blood or adoption" approach taken by most statutes.1
In addition to these proposals, which are based on a functional
parent-child definition, Michelle Harris would allow a court to use
discretion to create an intestate share for a dependent minor or
incompetent when the decedent was the sole caregiver for the per-
son. 9 Her proposal does not depend on creating a definition of
child, but rather uses the family maintenance model to give the
court discretion.'99 Her particular interest is in protecting grand-
children who would not be intestate heirs of the grandparents who
raised them.200
Marital Claims Against Probate Estates: Marvin Theories Put to a Different Use, 38 FAM. L.Q. 315
(2004).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 48-73.
192. See Mahoney, supra note 123, at 928-36 (using an in loco parentis standard to estab-
lish the necessary parent-child relationship).
193. See Gary, supra note 3, at 72-80.
194. See Anne-Marie E. Rhodes, Abandoning Parents Under Intestacy: Where We Are, Where
We Need to Go, 27 IND. L. REv. 517, 532-41 (1994).
195. See Irene D. Johnson, A Suggested Solution to the Problem of Intestate Succession in Non-
Traditional Family Arrangements: Taking the "Adoption" (and the Inequity) Out of the Doctrine of
"Equitable Adoption," 54 ST. Louis U. L.J. 271, 325-32 (2009).
196. Id. at 328.
197. See Tritt, Functionally Based Approach, supra note 99.
198. See Harris, supra note 127, at 260-63. Although based on family maintenance, the
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Proposals have also suggested using discretion in connection
with disinheritance statutes-statutes that deny an heir an intestate
share based on misconduct. Professor Rhodes identifies disinher-
itance statutes that permit judicial discretion in limited
circumstances, and calls the change "a step in the right direction"
in permitting distribution of property in accordance with a dece-
dent's intent.20 ' Paula Monopoli proposes a behavior-based model
for inheritance that would deny inheritance to fathers who aban-
don or do not support their minor children.2
At least one author has advocated broad discretion in the intes-
tacy context. Jennifer Hargis advocates discretion in intestacy
statutes to modify the statutory shares.20' She would allow "a broad
class of persons to apply for payment from an estateo2 0 ' and would
require the court to take into account a range of factors, including
the decedent's intent and the needs of the applicant.20'
More generally, Tanya Hernandez discussed better support for
2006
families of choice in laws relating to the disposition of remains.
She noted that "the role of the family of choice in the intestate
context merits greater study."2 7 She then expressed the hope that
future study will explore ways to incorporate an expansive
definition of family, in keeping with her arguments in favor of
decedent-controlled definitions of family.20
Most proposals focus on better ways to define family. Frances
Foster argues instead that inheritance law should abandon the
family paradigm and base revisions on either the "decedent intent
approach" or the "actual relationship approach."2  Her proposal
for a decedent intent approach focuses on wills law and notes that
applying the decedent intent approach to intestacy presents diffi-
culties. Extrinsic evidence could be admitted to establish intent,
but in the absence of any evidence of intent, the intestacy statute's
201. See Rhodes, supra note 134, at 991. Prof. Rhodes explains that although slayer stat-
utes carry out a decedent's intent in most situations, if the slayer was a spouse who killed the
decedent spouse at her request, in the face of a painful and terminal illness, the decedent
would likely want the spouse to inherit. Id. at 990.
202. See Monopoli, supra note 18, at 291-97.
203. Hargis, supra note 16.
204. Id. at 466. Hargis would include as applicants "a spouse, a former spouse receiving
maintenance, a child, one whom the deceased treated as a child[,] one whom the deceased
treated as a spouse, or anyone who was substantially financially dependent on the decedent
at the time of death." Id.
205. Id.
206. See Tanya K Hernandez, The Property of Death, 60 U. Prrr. L. REv. 971, 1019-28
(1999).
207. Id. at 1017.
208. Id.
209. Foster, supra note 5, at 257-71.
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default rules remain tied to the family paradigm. Expanding the
rules to include new categories-for example domestic partners-
might help, but would not solve the problem of defining people by
categories rather than by actual intent.
With respect to her actual relationship approach, Professor Fos-
ter suggests basing determinations of heirship on the relationships
between the decedent and survivors."o Relationships would be
those based on support (whether the decedent was the recipient or
provider); financial sharing by the decedent or the survivor; the
assumption of legal or decision-making responsibility for the dece-
dent or by the decedent for the survivor; and a relationship of
generosity from the decedent to the survivor. A court would have
to determine, based on the decedent's relationships, who would
receive the property and in what proportions. 2 1
III. A PROPOSAL FOR GUIDED DISCRETION
The drafters of the UPC continue to fine-tune the intestacy pro-
visions, but fine-tuning cannot address all possible decedent
situations. The expansive parent-child provisions will likely be
over-inclusive in many situations, and the complicated provisions
related to assisted reproductive technology will become out of date
as the science changes.2 1 2 Despite the fine-tuning, unmarried do-
mestic partners continue to be unprotected in the UPC's intestacy
statute. Children raised by the decedent will also be excluded if
they do not meet the status requirements of the UPC provisions. A
simplified set of default provisions with discretion to create or deny
intestate shares may be more likely to provide fair and just results
for more decedents.
The goals behind intestacy statutes are to give effect to a dece-
dent's intent, to provide for the needs of survivors, to support
public policy through financial and psychological support for the
family and through denying shares for misconduct, and to serve an
expressive function, affirming the importance of family and family
213members. A further policy behind current statutes is to permit
survivors to transfer a decedent's property efficiently and without
210. Id.
211. See id.
212. See lritt, Functionally Based Approach, supra note 99, at 407 (describing the 2008
Amendments as taking a "kitchen-sink approach"); id. at 428 (worrying that the ART sec-
tions will quickly become outdated).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 9-18.
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excessive cost. The proposal attempts to meet all these goals, bal-
ancing efficiency with results that will be fair for most people.
A. The Presumptive Intestate Shares
The intestacy statutes would continue to provide for family
members based on marriage or registration, and on a legal
parent-child relationship determined under the state's parentage
statute.1 If a legal determination of parentage had not been made
before death, the rules of the parentage statute could be used by
the probate court to determine parentage. Rather than including
the various nuances of the UPC, the statute would have minimal
options, with the proviso that a survivor could petition the court to
obtain or increase a share based on factors set out in the statute.
The initial shares would be those provided in a "simple" intesta-
cy statute. The statute would provide that the surviving spouse
would receive the entire estate, unless the decedent left descend-
ants who were not also descendants of the surviving spouse. If the
decedent left any such children or further descendants, then the
surviving spouse would get one-half the estate and the decedent's
descendants would divide the other half by representation. If a de-
cedent left no spouse or descendants, the property would go to the
decedent's parents; or, if none, to their descendants; and if none,
to the decedent's grandparents; and if they did not survive, to their
descendants. This structure would provide the basic framework for
distribution. The statute would also contain guidance to increase
or reduce these shares and to create other shares.
214. As reproductive technology changes, the parentage statutes will likely adjust more
quickly than the probate statutes. Tying the determination of parentage to the parentage
statute ensures that updates will apply, and will avoid the problem of having a person be
considered a child under a state's parentage act and not under the intestacy rules, or vice
versa. A serious problem under the UPA, on which some parentage statutes are based, is that
the UPA follows a one man/one woman model of parentage. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
§ 704 (2002), 9B U.L.A. 69 (Supp. 2011).
215. Oregon's intestacy statute is used as the basis for the presumptive shares. See OR.
REv. STAT. §§ 112.025-045 (2011). The proposal does not carve out a share for the surviv-
ing spouse of a small estate but simply applies the rule-one-half the estate or the entire
estate-depending on who survives.
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B. Reductions in Presumptive Shares
1. Reducing the Spousal Share
The court could reduce the spousal share based on evidence the
decedent would have preferred a smaller share for the spouse. The
court should consider the following factors: the length of the mar-
riage, whether the spouses were separated or had begun the
process to dissolve their marriage, whether the survivor had
engaged in marital misconduct,"" and whether the decedent's
parents or some other potential heir should receive a share of the
intestate (or a larger share, in the case of descendants) because of
factors such as care provided for the decedent and needs of the
potential heir. Factors would not include a more general evalua-
tion of the relationship, such as whether the spouses were
affectionate or entertained together. A reduction would be appro-
priate only if a significant break in the relationship had occurred.
2. Reducing the Share of a Descendant
A share created for a child or other descendant could be re-
duced based on abuse-either physical or financial-of the
decedent by the descendant. In the case of children, if the court
determines that a person whom the decedent had treated as a
child should take a share as a child of the decedent, the shares of
other children will be reduced to create a share for the potential
heir.
3. Reducing the Share of a Parent
A parent who abandoned, abused, or did not support a child
could be denied an inheritance, or the share could be reduced. By
leaving the decision to the court, denial could apply regardless of
the age of the child at death, so that a parent who had never sup-
ported a child would likely be unsuccessful if he appeared at the
adult child's death to claim a share. A court could decide that a
parent who was behind on child support payments because of her
216. See Allison Bridges, Marital Fault as a Basis for Terminating Inheritance Rights: Protect-
ing the Institution of Marriage and Those Who Abide by Their Vows-Til Death Do Them Part, 45
REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 559 (2010) (discussing marital misconduct in connection with
the elective share law).
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inability to work, but who remained active in the child's life, should
receive a partial share.
C. Categories of Potential Heirs
1. Domestic Partner
The proposal published by Professor Gallanis lists factors that
could be used to guide the court in determining whether a person
should inherit as a domestic partner.' In the case of a domestic
partner, the guidance would state that the share should be the
same as that for a spouse, absent other factors that would serve to
reduce the share. As in Professor Gallanis's proposal, proof of cer-
tain factors could create a presumption that the person is a
domestic partner and should receive a share. A statute in a state
that does not permit marriage or registration for same-sex couples
could provide that marriage or registration in another state would
create a presumption that the surviving partner should inherit.
2. Person Who Functioned As a Parent or Child
The proposals published by this author and by Professor Tritt list
factors that could be used to guide the court in determining
whether a person who functioned as a parent or child to the dece-
dent should inherit.' 8 A person deemed to be a child or a parent
should inherit the share the person would have inherited had the
person been considered a child or parent under the presumptive
rules.
3. Dependent
A person dependent on the decedent could also petition for a
share of the estate.2 9 The court would consider the needs of the
dependent person, the needs of presumptive heirs and other po-
tential heirs, and the size of the estate. The court would consider
the intent of the decedent in deciding whether to create a share
217. See Gallanis, supra note 51, at 87-90.
218. Gary, supra note 3, at 72-80; Tritt, Functionally Based Appmach, supra note 99, at 405.
219. Family maintenance statutes permit persons dependent on the decedent to peti-
tion for a share of the estate. See supra text accompanying notes 167-175.
822 [VOL. 45:4
The Probate Definition of Family
for the dependent, but the decedent's intent would not be disposi-
tive.
4. Person Who Provided Uncompensated Care
The court could consider whether to create a share for a person
who provided care for the decedent without compensation.220 Fac-
tors can include the decedent's intent, as well as equity. For
example, if a neighbor provided daily care for the decedent for
several years, and the decedent's presumptive heirs are children
who provided no care and never visited, the court may create a
share for the neighbor.
5. General Factors
Each category of potential heir would have factors specific to the
category. In addition to considering evidence related to the factors,
the court would consider written documentation of the decedent's
intent with respect to the estate, relationships the decedent had
and the length and type of those relationships, the financial needs
of the presumptive and potential heirs, and the behavior of the
presumptive and potential heirs toward the decedent.22' The pro-
posed provisions would direct the court not to alter presumptive
shares on the basis of behavior unless the behavior created signifi-
cant benefits or detriments for the decedent. The court would be
required to make findings based on the factors and evidence be-
fore creating a share for a potential heir or reducing a share for a
presumptive heir.
As the proposals for committed or domestic partners and the
proposals for children demonstrate, a statute could combine a
multi-factor test with presumptions and give a court sufficient
guidance in making a decision about whether someone should
qualify for an intestate share. This proposal differs from those ear-
lier proposals in that this proposal does not create a status category
for a domestic partner or child. The results reached through the
exercise of guided discretion, however, should be a share for a
domestic partner or child that is similar to the share that would be
220. See Foster, supra note 5, at 254 (advocating inheritance status for people in support
relationships with the decedent, both those supporting the decedent and those supported
by the decedent).
221. See Hargis, supra note 16, at 466 (describing factors to consider in creating discre-
tionary intestate shares).
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obtained under the other proposals. The difference is that the
judge can consider the factors given above in determining the
amount of the share as well as whether a share should be created.
The court would need to exercise a degree of discretion, but with-
in the parameters of a statute that could guide the discretion.
Provision of an intestate share based on functional status com-
bined with discretion will make intestacy statutes more responsive
to the donative preferences of more people. 2 22
D. Possible Criticisms of the Proposal
1. Two Tiers of Heirs
A critique of the proposal raises several issues that bear exami-
nation. The first is that the proposal creates a two-tiered approach,
with the presumptive heirs as first-tier heirs, and potential heirs in
the second tier.2 Domestic partners and members of stepfamilies
may feel slighted by this type of statute. A response to this critique
is that the potential heirs are not part of the intestacy system under
current law, and being a potential heir is better than not being an
heir at all. In addition, being a potential heir serves an expressive
function because the status recognizes the relationship between
the decedent and the potential heir, even if not at the level of the
status for presumptive heirs. The statute provides that these cate-
gories of people "count" and conveys that people in these
categories may have been of importance to the decedent.
Although the potential heir category improves statutes that do
not provide for these persons, an alternative for a state would be to
make one or more of these categories a presumptive heir. For ex-
ample, the statute could make a domestic partner a presumptive
heir. Even if the determination were based on factors rather than
status, the court could be required to make the determination ra-
ther than wait for the potential heir to petition.
222. From a political perspective, providing an intestate share for an unmarried partner
may be less controversial than adopting marriage for same-sex partners. See Harrington,
supra note 21, at 327 ("This Note does not attempt to argue that states should universally
recognize same-sex marriage or any equivalent.").
223. See Foster, supra note 5, at 256 (raising this concern).
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2. Definitions in Trusts
A second problem with the proposal is that definitions in intes-
tacy statutes are used for definitions of "heir" and "descendant" in
wills and trusts. If determining who will be considered heirs or de-
scendants depends on judicial discretion, interpreting the term in
a will or trust may require judicial analysis. Any court time required
will increase costs for probate or trust administration and will also
increase costs for the court. A response to this problem is that the
persons drafting wills and trusts will have to define what the docu-
ments mean by a term like "heir." A document could say that the
term includes only presumptive heirs, could provide for a court
determination based on the intestacy rules, or could create its own
definition to include domestic partners, step-relatives, or others. Of
course, the definitional problem will remain for documents draft-
ed before a change in the intestacy statutes. For older documents,
interpretation based on the statutes in effect when the documents
were executed may be appropriate.
3. Judicial Bias
224
A third potential problem with the proposal is judicial bias. If a
judge uses the authority provided in the statute to reward people
based on the judge's personal preferences, then the statute will
have failed in its goals. Although this concern exists, the concern
can be minimized with specific guidelines that narrow the discre-
tion. Experience with family maintenance in other countries
suggests that judges in those countries do not use the discretion
225granted them to apply personal preferences. The UPC already
reflects preferences of the drafters. As Professor Gaubatz pointed
out, judges should be able to determine the intent of a particular
decedent at least as well as drafting committees attempting to cre-
ate a statute reflecting the intent of all decedents. 226
224. See Mary Ann Glendon, PartialJustice, COMMENTARY 22 (1994) (arguing that "ad-
venturous judging"-decisions based on a judge's personal sense of fairness-is
problematic); Tritt, Functionally Based Approach, supra note 99, at 424 (identifying bias as a
concern with a functional parent-child definition but arguing that a factor test can reduce
bias). Alabama, Connecticut, Maryland, and NewJersey still have nonlawyer probate judges.
SeeJames Findley, The Debate over Nonlawyer Probate Judges: A Historical Perspective, 61 ALA. L.
REV. 1143, 1143 n.5 (2010). Although the practice of using nonlawyers as judges has been
criticized, see id. at 1156-59, nonlawyers should not be more likely to be biased than lawyers.
225. See Hargis, supra note 16, at 462-63.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 185-189.
825SUMMER 2012]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
4. Costs
A final critique of the proposal is a concern over increased costs
and efficient administration. Judicial discretion, if required in an
estate, will create costs, but the proposal attempts to balance fair-
ness to decedents and survivors while limiting additional costs. The
hope is that the presumptions and guidelines will make application
of this proposal reasonably efficient, while still providing an oppor-
tunity for potential heirs to seek a share of the estate. The proposal
will certainly increase costs in estates in which a potential heir peti-
tions for a share of the estate, but the benefits of better results for
the decedent and for survivors outweigh the downside of any in-
creased costs. The state may want to permit the judge to assess
costs against the petitioning heir to discourage frivolous petitions.
Another economic argument against increasing discretion in in-
testacy situations relates to transaction costs for property owners. A
person with property may decide that the intestacy statutes ade-
quately carry out her wishes. She may decide to avoid the costs of
having a will prepared in reliance on the disposition provided in
the intestacy statutes. If judicial discretion makes the outcome of
the intestate disposition uncertain, she will be unable to use the
statutes to plan for the disposition of her estate."'
CONCLUSION
Status-based inheritance is easy to apply. The status-marriage,
registration, birth, or adoption-either exists or does not exist, so
no evidentiary hearing will be necessary. The probate system works
best when it can operate efficiently, and no one wants to increase
the cost of probate. Judicial discretion could lead to controversy
and lengthy hearings.
The concerns about discretion are valid, but discretion has be-
gun to creep into intestacy statutes. Societal changes suggest that it
may be time for a greater degree of discretion, with guidance in
the statute as to how the court should apply the discretion. Criti-
cism of discretion in the past has focused on family maintenance, a
system that applies to testate as well as intestate estates. The pro-
posal set forth in this Article applies only in intestacy. The proposal
focuses on the decedent's intent, with a little room for moral eval-
uation in the event of bad behavior and for evaluation of the needs
of the heirs.
227. Hirsch, supra note 9, at 1065-69.
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The family of Dick and Jane depicted in childhood readers used
in the 1950s and 1960s may have never been representative of
American families, but in the twenty-first century even fewer fami-
lies reflect this nuclear model. Amendments to the UPC's intestacy
statutes have attempted to adjust to some of the changes, but the
variations among families are too great for one rule to match the
intent of most intestate decedents. With guided discretion, judges
will be able to apply intestacy statutes in ways that are more likely
to carry out the intent of more decedents. Professor Gaubatz iden-
tified the need for flexibility in intestacy statutes in 1977, and many
others have taken up this call. Professor Gaubatz concluded his
article with the following statement: "It is . . . to be hoped . .. that
the current law of decedent's estate is not that which will take us
into the twenty-first century."2 2 In the second decade of the twenty-
first century, reformers continue to tweak the intestacy codes, while
future intestate decedents wait for the reforms Professor Gaubatz
advocated.
228. Gaubatz, supra note 14, at 563.
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